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 Pregledni članak
THE DUAL INCOME TAX: IMPLEMENTATION 
AND EXPERIENCE IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES**
The paper summarizes the arguments in favour of a shift from comprehen-
sive to dual income taxation and complements the discussion by an overview 
on tax reforms which reveal the characteristic features of a dual income tax 
system. The scope of our analysis is not restricted to the Nordic countries, 
we also include other European countries, whose tax reform steps can be 
regarded as a move toward a dual income tax. Although there are problems 
of implementing and running a dual income tax system, we argue that it may 
be worthwhile for the Commission to consider dual income taxation as a 
blueprint for income tax coordination in the EU.
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1. Introduction
Dual income taxation has become an important blueprint for income tax re-
forms in Europe. Originally constrained to four Nordic countries in the beginning 
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of the 1990s, fi nal withholding taxes on capital income have been introduced in 
several European countries, e.g. Austria, Belgium, Greece, and Italy, and tax reform 
proposals in favour of a dual income tax system have been made for Germany and 
Switzerland.
This evidence backs Sijbren Cnossen’s reform agenda for European business 
taxation (Cnossen 2001, 2004), which contains the EU wide adoption of a dual 
income tax structure as an important fi rst step. 
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss the pros and cons of com-
prehensive, Schanz/Haig/Simons-type income taxation in section 2 and summarize 
the characteristic features of a dual income tax in section 3. Section 4 portrays the 
implementation of a dual income tax system in the Nordic countries, while section 5 
surveys tax reforms with selective dual income tax features in some other European 
countries. In section 6 we address problems of running a dual income tax regime 
in practice. The concluding section 7 summarizes our fi ndings and evaluates the 
perspectives for a European dual income tax scenario.
2. The Pros for and Cons against a Comprehensive Income Tax
The Schanz/Haig/Simons (SHS) type comprehensive income tax has been 
the fundamental principle of income taxation in the developed world for almost 
a century. 
2.1. Attractive Features of SHS Taxation
Tax equity has been a crucial desideratum in tax policy design in democratic 
societies. Advocates of equitable taxation seem to have agreed that comprehensive 
income is a socially acceptable indicator of a citizen’s ability to pay, which can be 
calculated in an easy and transparent way and serves as a reliable tax base for an 
equitable annual income tax. This view is backed economically, as the comprehen-
sive annual income of a tax payer determines potential annual consumption, viz. 
the ability to spend on consumer goods without forcing this tax payer to reduce 
the amount of assets held at the beginning of that year. 
With comprehensive annual income as the socially agreed indicator of ability 
to pay, SHS taxation ensures horizontal equity. Citizens with equal comprehensive 
income are equally well off before tax and are liable to the same amount of income 
tax. Their gross comprehensive income is cut by the same amount of money and 
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they end up equally well off after tax, exhibiting the same level of net comprehen-
sive income after tax. 
The comprehensive income tax also allows for suitably graduated annual tax 
payments to ensure vertical equity in line with socially agreed after tax distribution 
patterns. A higher level of comprehensive income, revealing a higher ability to pay, 
leads to a higher tax payment, which implies that the difference in net comprehen-
sive incomes is smaller than the difference in gross comprehensive incomes. The 
desirable gross/net reduction has to be agreed upon by social consensus. 
A fi nal important advantage of comprehensive income taxation is the sym-
metric treatment of different components of income. Starting out from a given 
level of comprehensive income, a marginal increase of any income component 
also increases comprehensive income by the same marginal amount and therefore 
the marginal tax rate on any income component is the same. The same marginal 
tax rate on all sources of income for a taxpayer implies a tax neutrality property. 
A given optimal income portfolio, characterized by the same rate of return for all 
income generating activities, will not be changed under a comprehensive income 
tax, as the net rate of return after tax is the same as well. 
2.2. Problems of SHS Taxation
There are, however, arguments against the SHS standard of income taxation. 
The objections raised address the fundamental concept as well as the practical 
implementation of comprehensive income taxation.
A fi rst objection argues that horizontal equity breaks down if equity is regarded 
as a lifetime rather than a one-period phenomenon. Annual comprehensive income 
taxation over the life cycle results in different present value tax burdens of citizens 
with an equal present value of comprehensive income (and therefore equal ability 
to pay) if the lifetime savings and consumption pattern differs. Basically consump-
tion smoothing through saving generates interest income which is taxable under a 
comprehensive income tax and thereby leads to a higher tax burden compared to a 
lifetime income pattern which requires less saving and less interest income over the 
life cycle. This is a clear violation of horizontal equity in a life-cycle perspective. 
The problem can be avoided under a consumption-based income tax, as advocated 
already by Irving Fisher and Nicholas Kaldor1. 
1  Kaldor’s expenditure tax concept for India and Sri Lanka failed and was rapidly repealed 
in the 1950s, but the idea has been alive and found prominent supporters under the heading of cash-
fl ow taxation (Meade Committee, 1978) or the X-base tax (Bradford 1986, 1989). A full-fl edged 
consumption-based income tax was introduced in Croatia in 1994 (Rose/Wiswesser, 1998), but 
repealed in 2001. 
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A second objection argues that horizontal equity breaks down if lifecycle sa-
ving can be organized by accumulating either human capital or capital assets. Capital 
accumulation requires the purchase of investment goods which must be fi nanced 
out of net earned income. There is no tax allowance for capital accumulation under 
a comprehensive income tax. Human capital formation in educational programmes 
requires investment in time, which incurs opportunity costs of foregone earnings. 
As potential labour income is not taxed under a comprehensive income tax, the 
total amount of potential gross earnings can be invested in human capital formation. 
For the individual worker comprehensive income taxation implies either to invest 
net labour income in real (or fi nancial) capital formation or gross labour income 
in human capital formation. The preferential treatment of human capital savers in 
comparison to capital asset savers who are equally well off in present value com-
prehensive income terms is another violation of horizontal equity. Again the problem 
can be avoided under a cash-fl ow tax, which exempts income which is invested in 
capital formation and taxes income only when it is used for consumption.
A third objection is directed against the neutrality property of taxing all factor 
returns at the same marginal tax rate. The argument is based on the fundamental 
lesson of second-best theory. If the comprehensive income tax is distorting, then 
the social welfare loss associated with the revenue requirement may be reduced 
if the unique SHS income tax wedge on comprehensive income is replaced by an 
income tax system which allows for different tax wedges on the components of 
comprehensive income. From an optimal income tax perspective the application of 
the same tax rate on returns from different factors under a comprehensive income 
tax regime is an additional restriction, which generally raises the social costs of 
public funds.
Although SHS taxation requires the proper calculation of all income compo-
nents which enter comprehensive income, the concept is robust against assignment 
problems of income to specifi c income categories. With respect to comprehensive 
income it is irrelevant if a farmer’s income from selling processed vegetables is 
regarded as income from farming or if it is already entrepreneurial income; shifting 
of income elements between income categories does not change the total income. 
The same is true for the debatable case whether old-age pension entitlements based 
on employment contracts and wage income in the past are classifi ed as employment 
income or as capital income.
The proper calculation of capital income under a comprehensive income tax 
is a serious problem, as any market-induced increase in wealth within a year has to 
be assessed as comprehensive income. Income accounting can only rely on proper 
market values if assets are sold. When the owner keeps the assets imputed prices 
have to be used and this assessment is subject to evaluation errors as well as stra-
tegic pricing. Tax payers have an incentive to use the asymmetry in information on 
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asset values to reduce their tax burden and the tax administration is hardly able to 
control tax evasion through strategic undervaluation of capital gains. As a matter 
of fact we fi nd deviations from the principle of comprehensive income taxation in 
tax codes throughout the world, allowing for a deferral of capital gains taxation. 
Technically this erosion of the SHS standard is called realization principle, which 
means that capital gains remain untaxed until the assets are sold.
Another problem of capital income taxation is the separation of nominal 
and real returns on interest bearing assets. Interest income is regarded as taxable 
capital income in tax codes referring to the SHS standard, although interest consi-
sts of two components which should be treated differently. The compensation for 
infl ation keeps the value of wealth constant in real terms and should not be taxed 
as comprehensive income. The real interest income increases wealth and thus is 
taxable capital income. Separating the two components requires the imputation of 
an economically correct infl ation rate. Most tax codes do not allow for infl ation 
adjustment of nominal values, since interest income is not the only fi eld for such 
a correction. Technically this deviation from the SHS standard is called nominal-
value principle which implies that valuation for tax purposes is based on nominal 
prices, even if they refer to different periods and constant prices would be the 
economically correct valuation vehicle.
Besides these systematic deviations from the SHS standard, tax legislation 
used to incorporate further regulations which have become standard elements of tax 
codes although they contradict to the principle of comprehensive income taxation. 
Usually these regulations are tax preferences which erode comprehensive income. 
These deviations from the SHS standard include the exemption of retained corporate 
profi ts at the personal level, the deferral of the taxation of old age pension claims 
until pensions are paid out2, the exemption of capital accumulation in pension 
funds or in life insurance saving, the exemption of capital gains in owner-occupied 
housing, etc. There are, however, other defi ciencies of income tax regimes which 
contradict the pure SHS standard and lead to overtaxation as, e.g., the double 
taxation of dividends under a classical corporate income tax, restrictions to loss 
offsets, limitations to depreciation of assets, ect.
2  It is interesting to note that tax deferral of pension claims is not regarded as a violation of 
the SHS standard and the ability to pay principle in the view of experts in tax law, and the discussion 
of a consistent treatment of old-age benefi ts in Germany have led the Constitutional Court to defi ne 
a „correspondence principle“, stating that old age savings income should be taxed only once over the 
lifecycle. This view ignores the problem of tax burden differentials in present value terms and does 
not recognize the confl ict with the SHS principle. 
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3. The Characteristic Features of a Dual Income Tax
The dual income tax3 is a schedular tax regime which divides total income into 
capital and labour income and regards them as different tax bases. The tax-base 
split offers an additional degree of freedom for tax policy, which can potentially be 
used to overcome some of the problems of comprehensive income taxation listed 
in the previous section.
Under the dual income tax income from different economic activities (doing 
business, self employment, employment, leasing land) has to be split into a capital 
and labour income. The allocation is simple for certain traditional income classes 
which are either capital income or labour income. Capital income includes divi-
dends, interest income, rents, but also rental values as well as capital gains of real 
capital and property. Labour income consists of wages and salaries, non-monetary 
fringe benefi ts, pension payments and social security transfers. Business income 
earned by business owners working in their own fi rm (proprietorships, partnerships, 
or self employed) however is compound income stemming from capital, which the 
owner has invested in his own fi rm, as well as from labour, if the business owner 
works in his own fi rm. Business income therefore has to be divided into a capital and 
a labour component. Capital income is taxed at a fl at rate, whereas labour income, 
on the other hand, is subject to progressive tax rates. Costs of earning capital and 
labour income are tax deductible from both tax bases, the principle of net returns 
is carried over from comprehensive income taxation.
The tax rate on labour income in the lowest income bracket is set equal to the 
rate on capital income, which intends to avoid tax arbitrage incentives for small 
scale labour and capital income earners. 
Personal allowances are deductible from labour income and thereby induce an 
element of indirect progressivity already in the fi rst labour income bracket. There is 
no general recommendation in dual income tax proposals if the personal allowances 
should be extended to capital income earners without labour income. 
For negative capital offset there are two options. Offsetting capital losses 
against positive labour income in the same period re-establishes an element of 
comprehensive income taxation, as the tax base of labour income is reduced and 
the tax reduction is calculated at the marginal progressive labour-tax rate. Offset-
ting capital losses by a tax credit which can be deducted from the labour tax bill 
is equivalent to a loss offset calculated at the fi rst-bracket labour-tax rate and the 
progressivity of labour taxation is not eroded. Excess credits can be carried forward 
or backward and offset against future or past capital or labour income. 
3  See also Boadway (2004), Cnossen (1999), Eggert and Genser (2005), Sørensen (1998, 
2005b).
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The dual income tax is compatible with various forms of corporate and per-
sonal capital integration. Separate taxation at both levels reestablishes classical 
double taxation, partial or full imputation implies that the corporate income tax on 
distributed profi ts becomes a prepayment of the dual income tax on capital. Under 
full imputation, dual income tax administration can be simplifi ed by choosing the 
corporation tax rate equal to the dual income tax rate. The corporation tax credit 
then exactly covers the dual income tax liability.
3.1. Why Is a Dual Income Tax Attractive?
The dual income tax is attractive because the regime mitigates some problems 
of the comprehensive income tax, addressed in section 2.1. Taxing capital and labour 
income at different rates allows paying attention to optimal taxation requirements, 
as the tax rates can be adjusted to the welfare costs of tax distortions. (See Nielsen 
and Sørensen, 1997; Sørensen, 2005b). As already noted in section 2.2, the income 
tax codes in most developed countries contain many exemptions from the principle 
of comprehensive income taxation but nevertheless politicians allege to follow the 
SHS standard in their tax policy. Most exemptions have been implemented in the 
past in a way, which pretends to maintain redistributive capital income taxation 
on the one hand and to master the challenges by the economic and administrative 
environment on the other. The result of these incompatible objectives is a low level 
of tax revenue combined with high compliance and collection costs. 
The dual income tax is a well defi ned alternative variant of a schedular system. 
It intends to create a level playing fi eld for capital investment by taxing all capital 
income at the same fl at tax rate. The dual income tax recognizes that the scope for 
progressive capital income taxation is limited. Taxing capital income by a fi nal 
withholding tax at a fl at and lower rate signifi cantly reduces tax compliance and 
collections costs. Cost saving would be considerable in Germany, where capital 
income below a savings allowance (Sparerfreibetrag) is exempt, but capital income 
in excess of the savings allowance is taxed at the personal income tax rate. A pro-
portional dual income tax, however, can be levied as a fi nal source tax without any 
fi ling requirement. A fl at capital tax has the additional advantage of reducing the 
tax rate differential between domestic taxes and source taxes in foreign countries, 
thereby limiting the incentives for capital fl ight. In addition, lower tax rates also 
reduce the problem of negative after-tax returns on real wealth under infl ation. 
Finally, a fl exible adjustment of capital income taxation to changing economic 
conditions as well as multilateral coordination, e.g., in the EU, is possible under 
dual income tax. 
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4. Implementation of the Dual Income Tax in the Nordic Countries
Table 1 surveys the main properties of the Nordic tax systems. In the early 
nineties the Nordic countries implemented dual income tax systems which exhibit 
some common features (see e.g., Sørensen; 1998; Cnossen, 1999; Lindhe et al.; 
2004). Capital income is taxed at a fl at rate equal or close to the corporation tax 
rate an to the labour tax rate in the fi rst income bracket. Labour income is taxed 
progressively. Indirect progression enters in the fi rst bracket due to personal 
exemptions, in the next brackets graduated marginal tax rates are applied to higher 
labour income levels.4 
A common problem in schedular systems is the misdeclaration of income. In 
order to distinguish labour and capital income in practice, an income splitting model 
was constructed. Active owners, who are working in their fi rms as managers or 
primary workers are forced to split their business income into a labour and a capital 
component. Basically, capital income is defi ned as the imputed return on the stock of 
business assets and the difference between business income and imputed returns is 
classifi ed as labour income. The calculation of the imputed rate of return is defi ned 
in national tax codes and differs between the Nordic countries. Income splitting is 
mandatory for sole proprietorships and partnerships, but also for corporations with 
active owners, who own a substantial share of their business (e.g., two thirds) and 
work in their fi rm for a minimum number of hours per year.
Table 1.
THE NORDIC DUAL INCOME TAX (2004 TAX RATES IN PERCENT)
Norway Finland Sweden Denmark
Implementation of the 
dual income tax 1992 1993 1991 1987












Basic allowance for 
capital income Yes Yes Yes Yes
Offset of negative 




4  The gap between the tax load on labour and capital income is even higher, as net labour 
income is further reduced by mandatory social security contributions.
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Integration of corporate 










Corporate income tax 












PIT on capital gains 28 d 29 30 28
Net wealth tax 0,9-1,1 0,9 1,5 No
Notes: a 28% for dividend income below threshold, 43% else
 b local income tax only; additional federal income tax is due for income levels excee-
ding a threshold of ca. € 32000
 c since 1994; 
 d net of retained earnings. 
Source: BMF (2005)
All Nordic countries allow for integration of capital and labour income, if 
capital income is negative. There is also integration of corporate and capital inco-
me, although there are considerable differences between the four Nordic countries, 
ranging from full integration in Norway and Finland to substantial double taxation 
in Sweden and Denmark. A fi nal characteristic feature of the Nordic countries 
(with the exception of Denmark) is that dual income tax is supplemented by a net 
wealth tax. 
Norway
The Norwegian tax reform of 1992 introduced a pure dual income tax. The 
splitting of income into a labour and a capital component is mandatory for all pro-
prietorships and self-employed businesses, and also for closely held companies, 
if the active owner possesses more than two thirds of the fi rm. Capital income 
in these businesses is determined by multiplying the value of capital assets by 
a fi xed rate of return on capital. This imputed rate of return is the same for all 
businesses and it is set equal to the interest rate on fi ve year government bonds 
plus a premium of 4%. Labour income is calculated as the residual difference of 
business profi ts minus imputed capital income. Labour income therefore comprises 
not only imputed (or effectively paid) wage income of the owner but also capital 
income in excess of the nationwide rate of return on capital. As a matter of fact, 
the residual income component is called earned income rather than labour income 
to refl ect this compound character of the “labour income” component. The rigidity 
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of progressive taxation of earned income is mitigated by special tax preferences. 
There exists an upper bound for residual profi ts, above which profi ts are taxed as 
capital income. Moreover, entrepreneurs are entitled to make a salary reduction of 
20% of their wage bill from the residual profi ts, which increases the share of lower 
taxed capital income. Although the dual income tax concept has been maintained 
there are problems with mandatory splitting of active shareholders in closely held 
companies. One solution to the problem of distinguishing between active and pas-
sive shareholders is the introduction of a shareholder income tax on excess capital 
income from 2006. (See Sørensen 2005a)
Finland
As in Norway, full imputation of the corporate income tax requires no further 
income tax payment for dividends at the personal level. Whereas no double taxa-
tion exists for distributed profi ts, it is not fully avoided for capital gains on share 
sales, because the purchase value of shares is not grossed up by the imputed rate 
of return on capital, as this is the case in Norway. Taxation of small companies 
differs as all companies which are not listed on the stock exchange are considered 
as closely held companies. Dividends exceeding the normal rate of return are ta-
xed at the progressive labour tax rate. In 2005 a major tax reform reduced the tax 
rates and replaced the imputation system by a reduced PIT rate system. The CIT 
rate was reduced from 29% to 26%, the withholding tax on dividends and interest 
from 29% to 28%. Double taxation of dividends is mitigated by exempting 43% of 
dividend income distributed by listed companies. Dividend income from nonlisted 
companies qualifi es for an additional exemption. There is a dividend allowance of 
9% of the companies’ net wealth up to a dividend threshold of € 90000 and only 
dividend income exceeding the 9% return margin and the threshold is subject to 
double taxation5. 
Sweden
Sweden introduced a true dual income tax in 1991 but deviated from this 
system only a few years later. Already in 1995 a classical system of corporate 
income taxation with double taxation of dividends was reintroduced, although 
5  For dividend income exceeding the € 90000 threshold but below the 9% margin the capital 
income tax rate of 28% applies, dividend income from nonlisted companies exceeding the 9% margin 
is taxed as earned income at progressive rates.
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mitigated by a reduced income tax rate of 30%. The reduced rate is applied to all 
capital income at the personal level, i.e. to dividends, interest income and capital 
gains. Income splitting for proprietorships and closely held companies is based on 
an imputed return, which is calculated by adding a premium of fi ve percentage 
points to the interest rate on 10 years government bonds. If actual returns are higher 
than the imputed return the residual is treated as labour income and taxed at the 
progressive labour tax rate. Dividends below the imputed rate of return are exempt 
from capital income tax and only bear the corporate income tax burden of 28%. 
The system includes further complexities, as capital gains of active shareholders 
are partly taxed at the progressive rate, while passive shareholders are subject to 
the proportional capital tax. 
Denmark 
Denmark was the fi rst country to implement a dual income tax as early as 1987, 
but the government’s dual income tax proposal was modifi ed in the parliamentary 
process and dividend income was never taxed at a single fl at rate. Moreover, di-
vidend income is double taxed at the corporate and the personal level, although at 
a reduced rate. Since 1994 dividends are subject to a 28% withholding tax, which 
is fi nal for dividend income below the threshold and which credited against the 
higher tax rate of 43% for dividend income above the threshold. The Danish income 
tax code distinguishes personal income, capital income and income from shares. 
But only income from shares is taxed at the reduced rates, whereas personal and 
capital income, in particular interest income, is taxed according to the progressive 
schedule. A separate schedule is applied to capital gains. 
5. Implementation of Schedular Income Tax Systems 
 in Other European Countries
Schedular tax structures which tax capital income at a low fl at rate but keep the 
progressive tariff for personal income have been implemented in other developed 
countries as well. While these tax reforms addressed in the next two subsections 
got majority support in the respective national parliaments, the discussion on dual 
income taxation is on the political agenda in other countries as well. Two recent 
examples are Germany (Spengel/Wiegard 2004) and Switzerland (Dietz/Keuschnigg 
2005) although it remains to be seen, how these proposals will perform in the tax 
reform competition in both countries.
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5.1. Final Withholding Income Taxes in Austria, Belgium and Italy
Austria, Belgium and Italy did not introduce a fully fl edged dual income 
tax but a fi nal withholding tax on interest income and dividend income. Labour 
income as well as earned business income is subject to a progressive schedule. For 
a couple of years a further dual income tax element was in force in Austrian and 
Italian corporate and noncorporate income taxation but abolished again recently. 
In contrast to the Nordic countries there is no integration of earned income and 
negative capital income, but Austria and Belgium allow for a fi ling option for low 
capital income earners, which implies that fi led capital income is taxed according 
to the progressive earned income tax schedule. 
Table 2.
FINAL WITHHOLDING TAXES ON CAPITAL INCOME 
(2004 RATES IN PERCENT)
Austria Belgium Italy
Tax reform 1994 1993 1991
Personal income tax rates 








Basic allowance for 
capital income Filing option Filing option No
Offset of negative 
capital income No No No


















PIT on capital gains 25 33 27
Net wealth tax No No No
Notes: a reduced rate on returns on newly injected capital. 
Source: BMF (2005)
All three countries tax dividend income at the corporate and the personal 
level. The corporation tax on dividends is supplemented by a fi nal withholding tax 
on dividends at the personal level. The combined tax burden on equity profi ts is 
therefore close to the top personal income tax rate on earned income. 
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Dual income tax elements generating a lower tax rate on capital income are 
restricted to interest income, which is subject to the low fi nal withholding tax 
(Table 2) and, at least for some years in Italy and in Austria, to a share of business 
profi ts, which was calculated as an imputed return on newly injected capital (see 
Bordignon et al. 2001 and Wagner 2001). In Italy the reduced rate of 19% (instead 
of 34%) was abolished in 2004, when the imputation system was replaced by a 
“classical system” with a reduced personal income tax rate. In Austria the reduced 
tax rate of 25% became irrelevant, when the standard corporate income tax rate 
was reduced to 25% (from 34% before) in 2005. At the same time, the minimum 
tax rate on earned income was raised to 38,3% (from 21%) whereas the 25% fl at 
rate on capital income remained unchanged. 
5.2. Special Regimes for Capital Income Taxation 
 in Greece and the Netherlands
The Netherlands and Greece recently also moved towards a dual income tax 
structure, although the tax relief for capital income is based on specifi c regulations 
which do not show all the features of the Nordic dual income tax.
The Netherlands implemented a comprehensive tax reform in 2001 which 
subjects dividend and interest income to a presumptive income tax at the personal 
level (Cnossen and Bovenberg, 2001). The presumptive personal income tax is 
levied at a rate of 30% on capital income, which is calculated by applying an im-
puted return of 4% on the average net value of assets in the tax period. The imputed 
personal income tax is equivalent to a 1.2% wealth tax on net assets and covers 
capital income of asset holders from dividends, interest and royalties. Personal 
allowances cause an indirect progression at the personal level of this “Box 3” type 
investment. Dividends, interest and capital gains from substantial shareholding 
are classifi ed as “Box 2” type investment income and are taxed at a fl at personal 
income tax rate of 25%. These fl at rates remained unchanged when the Netherlands 
reduced the CIT rate to 31,5% (from 34,5%) and raised the fi rst bracket PIT rate 
to 34,4% (from 33,4%) in 2005.
Greece is the only EU-15 country which exempts dividends at the personal 
level.6 Thus, dividends are taxed at the corporate income tax rate of 35% which is 
only slightly lower than the top personal income tax rate of 40%. The tax relief is 
more pronounced for interest income, which is subject to a fi nal withholding tax 
(10% on bonds and 15% on bank deposits).
6  Among the EU25 dividend exemption was also adopted in Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, and 
since 2005 also in Slovakia.
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Table 3.
SPECIAL TAX REGIMES ON CAPITAL INCOME 
(2004 RATES IN PERCENT)
Netherlands Greece
Tax reform 2001 1993




30 (Box 3)/25 (Box 2)





Basic allowance for capital 
income for Box 3 No
Offset of negative capital 
income No No
Integration of corporate and 
personal income tax
Reduced 
personal income tax rate
Dividend
exemption








PIT on capital gains 30 (Box 3)/25 (Box 2) No
Net wealth tax 1,2a No
Notes: a levied as presumptive personal income tax. 
Source: BMF (2005)
6. Problems of Running a Dual Income Tax
While it is recognized that the Nordic dual income tax has a number of advan-
tages over the hybrid and widely eroded comprehensive income tax systems, there 
is no doubt that the dual income tax system implemented by the Nordic countries 
must not be regarded as an ideal solution for income taxation in practice. There 
have been a series of amendments to improve the dual income tax systems and 
further reform steps are called for.
One major problem of operating a dual income tax is the separation of bu-
siness income into capital and labour income. Calculation of capital income by 
imputing an average return on business assets is a crude measure and does not pay 
proper attention to the opportunity costs of capital7. Moreover, the prescription of 
7  This is also the experience in Croatia, where a protective interest rate was administered to 
run the  consumption-oriented income tax regime between 1994 and 2001. 
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the imputation rate by the tax code has to be regarded as the outcome of a political 
bargaining game and is only loosely connected to economic theory. But multiple 
imputation rates will certainly intensify the bargaining process and reduce tran-
sparency, rather than generate economically desirable results. 
Defi ning labour income as residual profi ts is also a procedure open to criticism. 
Residual labour income does not only comprise a return on labour but includes 
economic rents, risk premia, and windfall profi ts which usually are considered as 
capital returns. Thus the question arises if these components of residual income 
should qualify for preferential taxation as well. The Norwegian experience of resi-
dual income thresholds and salary deductions is a striking example for the scope of 
successful political lobbying for preferential tax treatment (Christiansen, 2004).
While a level playing fi eld for highly mobile capital investment is a crucial 
desideratum, nonintegration of corporate income tax and personal income tax, 
preferential treatment of capital returns and nominal interest taxation provoke tax 
arbitrage and investment distortions. At the same time, however, capital tax arbitrage 
is less of a problem under dual income tax because of the lower tax rate.
Finally one major advantage of dual income tax, the substantial reduction in 
compliance, collection and control costs has not been exploited fully in the past. The 
fi ling option for capital income owners, the possibility for labour income earners 
to offset capital losses, or the different treatment of domestic and foreign capital 
income are costly methods of tax administration and certainly deserve further 
attention in dual income tax reform steps.
7. Concluding Remarks
Starting out in four Nordic countries schedular income taxation has gained 
support in many European countries. Although evidence in these countries reveals 
that it is not an easy task to implement a dual income tax structure, there seems 
to be little political pressure to return to comprehensive income taxation in these 
countries. 
One major advantage of dual income tax is the easy integration of corporate 
and personal income tax. Although the current picture of corporate income taxation 
in Europe exhibits a clear affi nity towards classical double taxation (mitigated by a 
low corporate income tax rate and a reduced personal income tax rate) Finland and 
Norway show that imputation can be administered in a reasonable way, if corporate 
income tax credits and withholding taxes on interest fully cover the capital income 
tax at the personal level. 
Incentives for strategic income shifting between capital and labour income 
can be reduced if the labour income tax rate in the fi rst income bracket and the 
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capital income tax rate coincide. Gains in compliance and collection costs must 
nevertheless be balanced with the costs of reduced fl exibility, if the tax rates of the 
corporate income tax, the capital income tax and the fi rst bracket labour income 
tax are tied. 
The adoption of dual income tax systems in a pure or partial form generates 
a new playing fi eld for tax harmonization plans in the EU. Whereas the proposals 
of the Ruding Committee in the early nineties on a common European corporate 
income tax were forcefully rejected by the Commission as well as national go-
vernments, the recognition that a stronger alignment of capital income taxation 
in the enlarged EU-25 might prove benefi cial for the internal market will be on 
the agenda of the Ecofi n Council. A move towards dual income taxation has been 
proposed as a promising starting point for coordinating corporate income taxation 
in the EU (Cnossen 2004). If the tax rates on capital and labour differ in the EU 
member states, then coordination steps in capital income taxation should face less 
opposition in the member states because the tax rate autonomy on labour income, 
which is far more sensitive with respect to country specifi c fi scal and distributional 
objectives, remains unaffected and might even be extended to subfederal levels 
without provoking capital fl ight.
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DUALNI POREZ NA DOHODAK: PRIMJENA I ISKUSTVO 
U EUROPSKIM ZEMLJAMA
Sažetak
Ovaj rad daje pregled argumenata kojima se zagovara prijelaz od sintetičkog poreza na 
dohodak na dualno oporezivanje dohotka. Rasprava završava pregledom poreznih reformi 
koje otkrivaju karakteristične značajke dualnog poreznog sustava. Analiza nije ograničena 
samo na nordijske zemlje, već uključuje i one europske zemlje porezne reforme kojih kreću 
u smjeru uvođenja dualnog poreza na dohodak. Iako kod uvođenja i funkcioniranja dualnog 
poreza na dohodak postoje određeni problemi, smatramo vrijednim truda da ga Komisija 
razmotri kao obrazac za koordinaciju poreza na dohodak u Europskoj uniji.
Ključne riječi: reforma poreza na dohodak, dualni porez na dohodak
